We examine the effects of either exogenously imposing or endogenously letting subjects choose whether to impose minimum contribution levels (MCLs) in a linear public goods experiment using the strategy method. Our results on contribution levels to the public goods are fairly independent of how MCLs are imposed. We find that the main effect of an MCL on unconditional contributions is that it increases low contribution levels to the MCL imposed, while the effect of those contributing more than the MCL before its introduction depends on the size of the MCL. Unexpectedly, there is much more crowding out for a low MCL than for a relatively high MCL. However, the distribution of contribution types is stable across different MCLs.
Introduction
One option available to policy makers for increasing contributions to public goods is to introduce minimum contribution levels (MCLs). For example, some municipalities introduce minimum levels regarding the sorting of waste, while others introduce driving restrictions in order to contribute to the public good of clean air or of low emission levels. Other examples are requests of minimum monetary contributions in disaster relief or in keeping the sidewalks in front of one's house free of snow and ice in winter; in the former case there are such practices in China after the Wenchuan earthquake, and in the latter case, there are certain minimum requirements established by law in Germany and Austria.
Existing studies have analyzed the effects of an MCL, often framed as a tax, on voluntary contributions using public goods experiments (e.g., Andreoni, 1993; Chan et al., 2002; Sutter and Weck-Hanneman, 2004; Eckel et al., 2005; Gronberg et al., 2012) . The general finding is that a minimum level does not completely crowd out voluntary contributions by reducing intrinsic motivations to contribute to the public good (for an in-depth discussion on motives, see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) . In the context of principal-agent games where the principal can set a minimum effort level that has to be exerted by the agent, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that MCLs have a negative overall effect on voluntary contributions, while in a follow-up study Ziegelmeyer et al. (2012) do not generally find a similar effect.
The objective of this paper is to provide a more detailed account of how contributions to a public good are affected by an MCL. To this end, we augment an incentivized version of eliciting individual cooperative preferences based on the strategy method (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008; Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; Martinsson et al., 2013; Martinsson et al., 2015) with two different MCLs. In the design introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001) , individuals make two types of contribution decisions for the public good: (i) unconditional contributions and (ii) conditional contributions, i.e., what the subject would contribute to the public good given different average contribution levels by the other group members. The setup eliminates the strategic uncertainty that is inherent to social dilemma games, and thus lets us focus on the incentive effects of MCLs and their potential side effects. It allows for distinguishing between two types of players in a social dilemma (accounting for about three-fourths of the population): free riders, who contribute nothing regardless of the contributions of others, and conditional cooperators, who are willing to increase their own contribution if they know that others will do so as well (see also Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Keser and van Winden, 2000) . In our laboratory experiment, we implement two different MCLs -a low and a high (2 out of 20 and 7 out of 20 tokens, respectively) -in order to assess their potentially distinct impact on voluntary contributions.
We are primarily interested in three effects of MCLs on the level of conditional cooperation: (i) Does the MCL affect those who are actually bound by the minimum level in addition to the pure effect 3 of introducing the MCL? For example, do subjects who contribute fewer or equal to 2 tokens without an MCL contribute exactly 2 tokens with an MCL=2? (ii) Is the distribution of contributions among those contributing more than the imposed minimum level unaffected by the introduction of the minimum level? And (iii), does the introduction of MCLs change the distribution of contributor types, i.e., does the distribution of free riders and conditional cooperators change?
Our first experiment implements exogenous MCLs. The data show that decision makers are affected by MCLs and that the effects on contributions under the low MCL and the high MCL are different. In the case of a low MCL, average contributions remain largely the same as without an MCL, despite the forced increase in contributions for very low contributors. This is explained by a decrease in average contributions by those who have been willing to contribute more than the minimum requirement without the MCL already. Hence, there is crowding out. Under the higher MCL, conditional contributions among those contributing more than the minimum level already before the implementation of the MCL are also affected negatively. However, it seems that those who contribute less than the MCL without an MCL "overshoot" the MCL. Looking at the contribution schedules of the conditional contribution elicitation, we see that conditional cooperators decrease their contributions for MCL=2 (a smaller slope) compared to MCL=0, whereas the contribution function for MCL=7 looks almost identical to the one for MCL=0, taking into account the lower-limit censoring at 2 and 7, respectively.
Since the efficiency of institutional mechanisms may depend on how they are implemented (e.g., Tyran and Feld, 2006) , we run a second experiment where MCLs are implemented endogenously.
More precisely, we elicit preferences over the implementation of the MCL by letting group members choose whether to implement an MCL or not. One randomly selected group member's choice then decides whether the MCL is implemented or not.
1 Interestingly, we find less "overshooting" but also less crowding out compared to exogenously implemented MCLs.
One explanation for the different impact of the two MCL regimes in both experiments is that MCLs could serve as signals, anchors, or reference points for intrinsically cooperative decision makers. While a low MCL drags the contribution of some decision makers slightly downwards, because the bulk of the distribution of contributions is above the MCL without any restriction, it could be the opposite for higher MCLs. Note however that any potential reference point effects are not as straightforward as they seem: We do not observe the mass of distribution of contributions moving exactly to the levels of the MCLs. In fact, the shifts are more gradual. As a practical implication of our results, it seems important not to introduce too low MCLs in the field in order to avoid potentially adverse reference point effects.
1 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the design and the results of our first experiment. In Section 3 we focus on our second experiment with endogenous MCLs.
Section 4 discusses the results and concludes the paper.
Experiment 1 -Exogenously imposed MCLs

Design of Experiment 1
Our experimental setup builds on the design by Fischbacher et al. (2001) . It is a one-shot linear public goods experiment, using a variant of the strategy method. In the experiment, subjects were randomly matched into groups of four. Each member received an endowment of 20 tokens and had to decide how much to allocate to a private and a public good, respectively. The payoff function for subject i is given by
where c i denotes the contribution of subject i to the public good. In the experiment, each token was exchanged for 0.7 yuan. 2 Assuming that subjects are selfish and rational, the dominant strategy for any marginal per capita return below one is to free ride, i.e., to contribute nothing to the public good. However, since the social return from any contribution to the public good was 2.4 tokens, everybody is better off if all group members contributed. Hence, the participants faced a social dilemma between privately optimal and socially optimal behavior.
In the Fischbacher et al. (2001) design, subjects are asked to make two decisions: first an unconditional contribution to the public good and then a conditional contribution. The unconditional contribution is an integer number of tokens in the permissible range. Our three treatments (see We implemented a mixture of a within-subject and a between-subject design with full control for potential order effects. The design gives four combinations (sequences) of two one-shot public goods experiments (here denoted Part I and Part II), as summarized in Table 1 , given that we always wanted to keep the comparison with the treatment MCL=0. There was no feedback between Part I and Part II.
After conducting Part I, our subjects were randomly matched into groups with new members in Part II,
i.e., we implemented a perfect stranger matching, and this procedure was common knowledge from the beginning of the experiment. Both parts were payoff-relevant. The experiment was run with context-free instructions. 4 It was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at
Renmin University of China in Beijing. Average earnings amounted to 43.90 yuan. 
Results of experiment 1
We distinguish between results for unconditional contributions (Section 2.2.1) and results for conditional contributions (Section 2.2.2).
Unconditional contributions
We begin by testing whether order effects are present in our data. For each minimum level, we test whether unconditional contributions are the same in Part I and Part II. Since we cannot reject the hypothesis of no order effects in any of the combinations at the 5% significance level based on a twosided Mann-Whitney U-test, we pool the data over the different orders in the following analyses. The unconditional contributions with MCL=0 are well in line with comparable studies that use a similar one-shot design in other countries. Kocher et al. (2008) , for instance, report averages for unconditional contributions of 8.11 in the U.S.A, 7.53 in Austria, and 7.22 in Japan.
3 Moreover, subjects in the experiment were asked to guess the average unconditional contribution of the other three group members (rounded to integers). The subjects were monetarily rewarded depending on the accuracy of their guesses as in Gächter and Renner (2010) . 4 Available from the authors upon request.
5 For comparison, a lunch in the student restaurant cost 10 yuan at the time of the experiment. In Table 2 , we summarize unconditional contributions to the public good. As expected, average contributions are higher when a minimum level of 7 is introduced (8.44 vs. 10.92), and this increase is significant at the 1% level compared with MCL=0, using a within-subject comparison (two-sided
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Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p < 0.01; N = 72). There is no significant change in the levels of contributions when a minimum level of 2 is introduced compared to MCL=0 (7.58 vs. 7.69).
Comparing across treatments, contributions with MCL=7 are significantly higher at the 1% level than with MCL=2 (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p < 0.01; N = 144). It is important to note that the baseline level of cooperation under MCL=0 is not significantly different between the two treatments,
i.e. Sequences 1 and 2 versus Sequences 3 and 4 (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.32; N = 144). We now look at two questions related to the effects of MCLs on the level of conditional cooperation: (i) Does the MCL affect those who are actually bound by the minimum level in addition to the pure effect of introducing the MCL? And: (ii) Is the distribution of contributions among those contributing more than the imposed minimum level unaffected by the introduction of the minimum level? Table 3 provides detailed analyses of the effects of introducing an MCL. If behavior is unaffected by the introduction of an MCL of 2 (of 7), the proportion of subjects contributing 2 (7) in treatment MCL=2 (MCL=7) is expected to be equal to the proportion contributing 0, 1, and 2 (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) in treatment MCL=0.
We start our analysis with the low MCL, i.e., MCL=2. In the case of MCL=2, 29.2% of decision makers contribute 2 tokens to the public good, compared with 30.6% contributing 0, 1, and 2 under MCL=0. If all decision makers that are bound by the MCL would contribute exactly 2 tokens in MCL=2, the average would be 2, obviously. However, the average contribution is 4.50 tokens under MCL=2. This difference between the "projected" contribution of 2 and actual average contributions is highly significant (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test comparing actual contribution levels and the projected level of 2, p < 0.01; N = 22). Interestingly, low contributors seem to "overshoot" the MCL on average. When looking at those who contribute more than 2 tokens under MCL=0, we observe averages of 10.76 when MCL=0 and 9.10 when MCL=2. Hence, on average, a highly significant crowding out effect occurs (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p < 0.01; N = 50). Taking the two groups together, the overall small change in average contributions from MCL=0 (7.58) to MCL=2 (7.69) can be explained by the offsetting effects of "overshooting" the MCL and the occurrence of crowding out for contributors who contribute more than 2 tokens even when MCL=0. 
Conditional contributions
Does the introduction of MCLs change the distribution of contributor types, i.e., does the distribution of free riders and conditional cooperators change? Figure 1 presents the average results from the contribution table. As expected, on average, the contributions increase as the average contributions of others increase, regardless of the MCL. Interestingly, however, while the slope in MCL=2 is smaller than in MCL=0 and, hence, the MCL does not increase average conditional contributions throughout the whole interval of others' average contributions, the slope in MCL=7 is approximately similar to the one in MCL=0. As a consequence, conditional contributions are higher in MCL=7 than in the other two treatments, also in the range clearly above the lower censoring limit of 7. In order to study this Based on the conditional contribution schedules, we can classify subjects into different types of contributors. We follow the convention (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001) and define four general types of subjects: conditional cooperators, free riders, hump-shaped contributors, and others. Here are the definitions that we use: If a subject's conditional contribution increases weakly monotonically with the average contribution of the other group members, the subject is classified as a conditional cooperator. A subject is also classified as a conditional cooperator if the relationship between own and others' average contributions is positive and significant at the 1% significance level based on the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. Hump-shaped contributors are subjects who show weakly monotonically increasing (or increasing with a Spearman rank correlation coefficient at the 1% significance level) contributions up to some, non-maximal level of others' contributions; above that level, their conditional contributions decrease based on a reversed classification as the one used up to the inflection point. A free rider is a subject who contributes zero for all levels of the other group members' contributions under MCL=0, 2 tokens under MCL=2, and 7 tokens under MCL=7. Finally, those who cannot be categorized into any of the above categories are referred to as others. Tables 5 and 6 report results on the stability of the classification across different MCLs by providing a transition matrix with regard to types. Overall, the distributions of contribution types are quite stable across MCLs (see Ruigrok et al., 2012 , for an assessment of temporal stability of contribution types, but not across different institutional environments). The tables show, by looking at the diagonal, that a large proportion of subjects do display the same type of behavior under different institutional mechanisms. The few changes go in all directions and seem to be more or less random.
Some conditional cooperators become free riders; particularly under MCL=7, these are decision makers who have an increasing contribution schedule under MCL=0 with a maximum contribution of 7 tokens or less. Overall the distribution of conditional cooperators and free riders are not out of the ordinary (see for instance, Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008; Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; Martinsson et al., 2013; Martinsson et al., 2015) and switches from one type to another are rare.
Experiment 2 -Endogenously imposed MCLs
Design of Experiment 2
The setup follows Experiment 1 closely. As in Experiment 1, subjects were randomly matched into groups of four, and they made contribution decisions following the Fischbacher et al. (2001) design.
Again, we implemented a mixture of a within-subject and a between-subject design with full control for potential order effects. The design gives four combinations (sequences) of two one-shot public goods experiments (denoted Part I and Part II), as already summarized in Table 1 . The only new feature is the endogenous determination of the MCL: the experiment began with a "voting" stage where subjects indicated whether they wanted Part I or Part II to be payoff-relevant. This choice indicates the preference for either MCL=0 or MCL=2 in Sequences 1 and 2, and the preference for either MCL=0 or MCL=7 in Sequences 3 and 4. Once everyone had casted their vote, Experiment 2 proceeded as Experiment 1. It was common knowledge that, in the end, one participant in each group would be randomly selected and her choice would be implemented (thus determining which part of the experiment would be payoff-relevant). This means that contribution decisions in both parts of the experiment were made in a situation where the MCL is endogenously imposed by one randomly selected group member.
The experiment was run by using context-free instructions that followed the instructions in Experiment 1, except for the necessary changes to explain the choice. 6 It was again computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the same experimental lab at Renmin University of China in Beijing as the first experiment. A total of 96 subjects participated in the experiment (24 in each sequence). Since only one part was payoff-relevant in Experiment 2 by the design of the endogenous mechanism, we doubled the exchange rate compared to Experiment 1 to make the monetary incentives comparable in the two experiments. Average earnings amounted to 44.0 yuan.
Results of Experiment 2
In order to facilitate comparisons of the two experiments, we proceed with our analysis of Experiment 2 in the same way as for Experiment 1. We first present results for unconditional contributions (Section 3.2.1) and then results for conditional contributions (Section 3.2.2). Finally, we show the 12 results on subjects' choices for the implementation of the MCLs and also how they relate to unconditional contributions and the distribution of contribution types (Section 3.2.3).
Unconditional contributions
Since there are again no significant order effects, we pool the data over the different orders.
Unconditional contributions are summarized in Table 7 . One can see a significant increase in contributions following the introduction of a minimum level of 7 tokens (6.27 vs. 10.17) (two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p < 0.01; N = 48). There is also a small increase in contributions following a minimum level of 2 tokens, but it is only significant at the 10%-level (6.58 vs. 6.83) (twosided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.09; N = 48). Qualitatively, overall unconditional contributions in Experiment 2 are very similar to the unconditional contributions in Experiment 1. We provide a more detailed analysis in Table 8 . In the case of the low MCL of 2 tokens, 35.4% of our subjects contribute 2 tokens to the public good, compared with 33.3% contributing 0, 1, and 2 under MCL=0. The average contribution in MCL=2 for this group of subjects is 2.25, and it is not significantly different from the "projected" contribution of exactly 2 (two-sided Wilcoxon signedranks test, p = 0.16; N = 16). For subjects who contribute more than 2 tokens under MCL=0, the average contribution decreases from 9.59 in MCL=0 to 9.13 in MCL=2, but the change is not significant on conventional levels (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.37; N = 32). Thus, in the case of a low MCL in our endogenous treatments, neither do we observe significant "overshooting" among low contributors, nor significant crowding out among high contributors.
In case of the high MCL of 7 tokens, 43.8% of subjects contribute 7 tokens to the public good, compared to 60.4% contributing at most 7 tokens in MCL=0. We observe significant overshooting among this group of subjects, since the average contribution of 8.21 in MCL=7 is significantly different from the projected contribution of 7 (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p < 0.01; N = 29). However, we do not see significant crowding out in MCL=7 for subjects who contribute more Note: We use two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. Table 9 shows the transition matrix in the two treatments. As in Experiment 1, stability in MCL=2 entails either (i) a contribution of 0, 1, or 2 tokens in MCL=0 and exactly 2 tokens in MCL=2, or (ii) a contribution of more than 2 tokens in both MCL=0 and MCL=2; and likewise for decision 
Null hypothesis P-values Sequences 1 and 2
Contributions in MCL=2 of those who contribute 0,1,2 in MCL=0 are equal to 2 0.16 Contributions in MCL=2 of those who contribute > 2 in MCL=0 are equal in MCL=0 and MCL=2
Sequences 3 and 4
0.37
Contributions in MCL=7 of those who contribute 0,1,…,7 in MCL=0 are equal to 7 <0.01 Contributions in MCL=7 of those who contribute > 7 in MCL=0 are equal in MCL=0 and MCL=7 0.21 14 makers in MCL=7. Table 9 shows that stability levels according to our definition are high: 89.6% and 79.3% in MCL=2 and MCL=7, respectively. In a more detailed analysis we classify subjects into contribution types. The definitions are identical to the ones used in Experiment 1. In Tables 10 and 11 we present the transition matrices with 
Conditional contributions
Preferences for MCLs and contribution behavior
In Table 12 , we summarize unconditional contributions, separating the results by preference for MCL.
A majority of subjects (66.6%) prefer MCL=2 to be payoff-relevant over MCL=0 in Sequences 1 and 2, and almost everyone (87.5%) prefers MCL=7 over MCL=0 in Sequences 3 and 4. On average, unconditional contributions are higher for subjects who prefer non-zero MCLs. For example, in MCL=2, the average contribution is 7.78 tokens for subjects with a preference for MCL=2, and this is significantly larger than the average of 4.94 tokens for subjects who prefer MCL=0 (two-sided MannWhitney U-test, p = 0.03; N = 48). Similarly, the average contribution for subjects with a preference for MCL=7 is 3.05 tokens larger than the average contribution from subjects with a preference for MCL=0 (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.05; N = 48). 
Discussion and conclusion
We study different MCLs experimentally in a linear public goods game, where we elicit both unconditional and conditional contributions. An obvious direct effect of introducing a minimum level is that all subjects intending to contribute less than the minimum level have to increase their contributions. If this is the only behavioral change, the proportion contributing at most the introduced minimum contribution level before it is introduced is the same as the proportion contributing exactly the minimum level after it is introduced, resulting in an overall positive effect on contributions.
However, there are two potential behavioral effects of introducing a minimum level: (i) the aforementioned proportion is not stable and (ii) the distributions of contributions among subjects contributing more than the imposed minimum level differ, when the minimum level requirement is imposed.
Our experimental results indicate that decision makers are affected by MCLs, but, interestingly, the effects on contributions under the low MCL and the high MCL are not necessarily the same. Our first experiment investigates the effect of exogenous MCLs. In the case of a low MCL, average contributions remain largely the same as without an MCL, despite the forced increase in contributions for very low contributors. This is explained by the fact that the positive shift for low contributors -18 indeed, on average, "overshooting" the MCL -is offset by a crowding out effect of the MCL for relatively high contributors. The latter effect is also present in our high MCL environment, but it is much less pronounced, making the former effect take over. Looking at the full contribution schedules of the conditional contribution elicitation, we see that conditional cooperators decrease their contributions under MCL=2 (a smaller slope) compared with MCL=0, whereas the contribution function for MCL=7 looks almost identical to the one for MCL=0, taking into account the lower-limit censoring at 2 and 7, respectively.
In a second experiment, we investigate the effects of endogenous MCLs. The second experiment can also be seen as a robustness check for the results in Experiment 1, since the implementation of the common decision for the MCL is deliberately very weak. We have no voting, no group discussion, and no other form of group interaction that would give the MCL a stronger normative connotation.
Nonetheless, in comparison with exogenous MCLs, the endogenous implementation of an MCL could send a signal of distrust to group members, similar to the hidden cost of control in Falk and Kosfeld (2006) , crowding out voluntary cooperation. Comparing the effect of MCLs across the two experiments, we find that there is less "overshooting" but also less crowding out when MCLs are endogenously imposed by one randomly selected individual in each group. Overall, the endogenously implemented MCLs work marginally better than the exogenously implemented ones, but given the size of the difference, one has to be careful not to over-interpret the result. In any case, the endogenous implementation seems to induce a more stable behavior (less "overshooting" and crowding-out). If stability is an objective, an endogenous implementation should be preferred. Taking a look at the contribution schedules, MCL=2 leads to a steeper slope in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1; for MCL=7, we observe the reverse. However, the overall picture (positive slope) looks similar. When one wants to interpret the differences between the two experiments cautiously, one could argue that the endogenous MCL sends a positive signal to the group members rather than one of mistrust.
However, one has to be careful in directly comparing results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 was added later on, following the request of a referee. Given that some time has passed between the two experiments, it is unclear whether we can assume full randomization of participants across the two experiments. Within the experiments, this is not an issue, but across the experiments the subject pool might have changed in dimensions that are difficult to observe (e.g., cohort effects).
One general explanation for our results is that MCLs might serve as signals, anchors, or reference points to intrinsically cooperative decision makers. Although future research has to look deeper into the relationship between MCLs and behavioral responses, it seems that higher MCLs shift contribution levels upwards without resulting in crowding out. While a low MCL seems to drag the contribution of some decision makers downwards, because the bulk of the distribution of contributions is above the MCL without any restriction, it seems that a higher MCL has the opposite behavioral effect. However, any reference point effect is more involved than a simple clustering, since we do not observe 19 significantly more mass exactly at the levels of the introduced minimum contributions. The shifts and crowding out effects are more gradual and particularly affect decision makers way above the MCLs. In principle, these results are consistent with the findings of Falk and Kosfeld (2006) , which seem to indicate that the effect of minimum control on profits is non-monotonic, with low levels of control generating lower profits. Similarly, Wang (2012) finds that when a minimum wage policy is introduced, the signaling or anchoring effect of a low level of the minimum wage results in a strong negative effect on wages offered by firms. However, Ziegelmeyer et al. (2012) do not generally observe a hidden cost of control in a follow-up study based on Falk and Kosfeld (2006) , and, moreover, the results from our second experiment using endogenous MCLs do not fully support an interpretation where the MCL sends a strong signal of distrust. Thus, more research seems warranted to better understand the psychology behind the effects. A natural extension of our setup, for instance, would introduce an MCL that is not fully binding but that involves a monitoring or auditing mechanism in order to increase compliance.
MCLs seem to be fairly independent of how they are imposed and this is a relevant result for policy makers. Additionally, our result of crowding out at low MCLs is a significant finding, since in most cases the only feasible MCL for policy makers is to impose a low MCL, which should be evaluated against the case of no MCL at all, or even better a higher MCL. Potential reference point effects seem to be less straightforward in an environment with MCLs. Interestingly, crowding out appears to become less relevant when the minimum requirement is higher; intuitively, one would probably have expected the opposite.
